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By Sir Colin Budd LSE IDEAS Advisory Board
The EU Experience of the Process of 
Economic Integration: Successes, Failures 
and Challenges
I must start with a caveat. Though I represent the LSE at this 
conference, I am myself no academic! As a diplomat turned 
politician my natural style, which I hope you will find stimulating, 
is nearer that of political journalism than it is to the drier groves 
of academe. Secondly, let me emphasise that, though the EU 
can always – as you can for us – provide ideas, and though you 
are naturally free to take out of what I say whatever you want, 
I realise full well that for all sorts of reasons it is by no means 
always appropriate to think of the EU as a model for the future 
of ASEAN. It must be for you to decide what in the European 
way of doing things is attractive, and what is not.
I say that with all the more clarity because we in Europe, though still decently proud 
of what the EU is achieving, know very well that overlapping with the speeding up of 
globalisation has been the declining validity of the assumption that what happens to 
the economies of the West matters much more than what happens to those of others. 
Whether one thinks in terms of pendulums swinging back or tectonic plates shifting, there 
are plainly in this century huge changes afoot in the world economy, adding importance 
all the time to your part of the world. Thirty years ago, emerging Asia was one eighth of 
the world economy, of which it is now around a third, with the fraction increasing by the 
day. Not least because of changes in the distribution of the world’s population – of which 
Europe in 1957 had 21%, today has 11%, and by 2050 is likely to have only 7%. Many 
people in Europe are rereading Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”.
Among Kennedy’s arguments, mind you, was the assertion that the strength of a Great 
Power – and much the same surely applies to a regional association of states – can only 
be properly measured relative to that of other such powers or associations. For that reason 
among others, study of the EU’s strengths – and they are on any analysis impressive -  no 
doubt has a proper place somewhere on ASEAN’s agenda. The EU has made very substantial 
progress towards the creation of a single market, creating millions of jobs and generating 
much extra wealth. It has a huge trade surplus, is the world’s leading exporter of services, 
accounts – excluding energy – for around 20% of global trade, and has just celebrated 
the tenth anniversary of its single currency, a reality already for 329 million Europeans.
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When the Secretary General of ASEAN visited Europe 
in July 2007 he stressed that though ASEAN was 
certainly not planning to take the EU model lock 
stock and barrel, it was always on the look out for 
good ideas and best practice, as it pursued the 
ambitious task of Community building. Especially in 
connection with its drive to become a more rules-
based organisation, with the task of narrowing the 
development gap between older and newer members 
of the group, and with the problems involved in 
cultivating a stronger sense of group identity.
The EU, I can assure you, has wrestled for decades 
with all those problems, and a myriad more. We 
have of course been in existence much longer than 
you, and have in certain respects chosen to go much 
further than you.   
Many of you will know the dramatic story of how 
France and Germany emerged in 1945 from their 
third cataclysmic war against each other in three 
generations, causing some of their leading figures 
to be utterly convinced of the need to found a new 
type of organisation, which would eliminate for ever 
the threat of nationalism. As Helmut Kohl always 
says, it was Winston Churchill’s Zurich speech of 
1946 which first publicly stressed the importance of 
a new friendship between France and Germany, to 
transform the old enmity into a new cooperation. 
Although Churchill himself did not envisage the UK 
joining the new grouping, he nonetheless argued 
the case for “a European group which could give a 
sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship 
to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and 
mighty continent”.
It took time to build the membership, which started 
with six member states in 1957, increased to nine in 
1973, then 12, then 15, and now 27. Already from 
the start there was a common trade policy and a 
common agricultural policy – plus a plan for a single 
market, though that was not achieved till 1992. It 
took time to build the consensus that was needed 
for successive further steps towards integration, and 
to build the balance between the institutions which 
we have today. The European Commission was there 
from the start, with the sole right of initiative. So was 
the Council, representing the member states. And so 
was the European Court of Justice. But the European 
Parliament has taken a long time to evolve, and the 
whole idea of “co-decision” – the practice whereby 
decisions in many areas are now taken jointly by the 
Council and the European Parliament, is still today 
advancing into new areas (or will do if the Treaty of 
Lisbon is ever agreed).   
We have the makings of a European polity, with 
political parties taking increasingly seriously 
the Europe-wide political groups to which they 
belong, but public opinion for the most part is still 
totally focussed on the national rather than the 
European level.
Many of you will know, and the rest will not be 
surprised to hear, that there has in Europe been 
endless controversy about advancing integration. As 
is no doubt true in Asia, too, states with long histories 
do not easily give up sovereignty.  The reference in 
the original treaty to “ever increasing union” has 
been taken by the integrationists as a licence to drive 
onwards towards a vision of a single, omnicompetent 
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body – and by the nationalists as proof positive of 
the evil of the whole enterprise.
The truth, I think it is fair to say, lies somewhere in 
the middle. There is no reason why the EU should 
be regarded, much though Murdoch-owned 
newspapers love to see it that way, as some kind of 
inevitably hostile leviathan, forever devouring new 
fields of competence.  The European Commission 
is no tyrant, the Court of Justice no enemy of the 
European peoples, and the European Parliament not 
the illegitimate cuckoo in the parliamentary nest some 
would make it out to be. If the checks and balances 
in the system are properly used, and if those at the 
helm exercise proper self-restraint, then the value of 
the Union’s institutions is that they can play a key role 
as the guarantors of fair play and even dealing:  the 
architects, groundsmen and referees who between 
them ensure both that the European playing field is 
made and kept level, and that those who play on it 
stick to the democratically agreed rules.   Rules which 
dictate, inter alia, that action should only be taken 
at the EU level where the member states cannot 
by themselves sufficiently achieve the objectives 
of the proposed action, and where that action, by 
reason of its scale and effects, can be better achieved 
by the Union. A doctrine often referred to as the 
subsidiarity rule.
I can return, if it helps, in discussion later to the more 
political aspects of integration, but my main focus 
will, as advertised, be on the EU’s movement towards 
further economic integration. And rather than recite 
a long list of successes, I will concentrate, since they 
are usually the more instructive cases, on the goals 
not achieved, the agenda still not realised – not least 
in the context we all now have in common: survival 
of and the fastest possible recovery from the current 
global economic crisis.I would therefore like to focus 
on the closely connected topics of the challenges – 
and where appropriate, the failures – confronting the 
EU in relation to the future of the Single Market, the 
Lisbon Agenda, and the euro.
The Single Market we have today represents a huge 
achievement. Business benefits enormously from 
the level playing field for the free movement of 
goods and services and – between 22 (double check: 
27?) EU member sates – people. Phone calls in the 
EU cost a fraction of what they did ten years ago. 
Air fares have fallen significantly. Consumers have 
much greater choice when buying electricity and gas. 
Business has benefited from major economies and 
efficiencies of scale.
Much, however, still remains to be done. Partly 
because the original design has still not been 
completed; partly because enlargement has brought 
in new member states which have further to go than 
the older ones;  and partly because the nature of any 
single market is that it can never be “completed”: 
it needs constant adaptation, constant change, 
constant modernisation.
The facts, for instance, show that the services sector 
has opened up to full integration more slowly than 
markets for goods – though a major new law was 
adopted in 2006, enabling companies to offer a 
range of cross-border services from their home base. 
Delays have also affected financial services. Most were 
liberalised by 2005;  and in March 2007 it was agreed 
to unify national payments regimes, which has made 
it easier to use credit and debit cards abroad and to 
transfer money from one member state to another. 
But bank charges for cross-border payments are still 
higher than they should be, and the fragmented 
nature of national tax systems continues to put a 
brake on market integration and efficiency. Whether 
one looks at financial services or telecommunications, 
postal services or energy, the reform enthusiasts in 
Europe know how much further there still is to go 
before full liberalisation is achieved.
They also know, as the Treaty of Lisbon makes clear, 
that in future the focus will need to be not so much 
on the progressive establishment of the internal 
market and more on establishing and ensuring its 
functioning. The member states must move, faster 
and more efficiently than before, to translate EU 
rules into their national legal systems, and where 
necessary to enforce them. They need to set up 
administrative structures – such as points of single 
contact for businesses. And they need to make sure 
that consumers both know and can use their rights 
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– so that maximum choice and the best quality at 
the lowest prices become a reality.   
All this is the more important because securing the 
implementation of the EU’s Single Market rules and 
standards has long since ceased to be important 
solely for the EU. In recent years the EU has as you 
know increasingly been emerging as a global rule 
maker, shaping and influencing rules and standards 
worldwide. In many areas such as product safety, 
environmental protection, public procurement, 
financial regulation and accounting the EU has in 
effect become the global standard-setter. The GSM 
standard, for example, was created in Europe in 1982 
but is now used by over three billion mobile phone 
customers in 212 countries, worldwide.
The Single Market, however, is only part of creating 
an effective modern economy.   Another vitally 
important campaign is that known in Europe as 
the Lisbon Agenda. Nothing to do with the Lisbon 
Treaty – but the programme agreed at the Lisbon 
summit of March 2000 with the aim of modernising 
the European economy, the aim being to turn the EU 
by 2010 into the “most dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world”.
Progress towards that aim has, to say the least, been 
patchy! As already noted, the internal market in 
goods is well integrated, but that in services is still 
fragmented. Competition in the network industries, 
such as telecoms and energy, is uneven, with national 
champions continuing to dominate their home 
markets.   Youth unemployment remains far too high. 
Far too many children do not complete secondary 
education. Some member states have made far less 
progress than others. And so on.
The goals of the Lisbon Agenda remain sound 
enough: the perfection of the information society, 
a European area of research and innovation, help for 
SMEs (small and medium enterprises), the completion 
of the internal market, coordinated macroeconomic 
policy, better education and training, and an active 
employment policy. But the EU remains only partially 
integrated, with a lot of variable geometry, and is still 
of course in some key respects less well integrated 
than the United States, having after all no common 
language, an only partially common currency, and 
very rigid labour markets.
The simplest and best guide to the EU’s Lisbon Agenda 
progress is produced every year in February by the 
London-based Centre for European Reform. Its latest 
report – “Scorecard IX” – is entitled “How to emerge 
from the wreckage”. As it points out, a good number 
of Europeans have long regarded the Lisbon agenda 
as an attempt to import into Europe the dreaded 
“Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism”.  Not surprisingly, 
they are now trying to argue that the financial crisis 
discredits the Anglo-Saxon model, and hence Lisbon. 
To which one can of course respond that though some 
assumptions about the financial sector certainly need 
to be rethought, the baby should not be thrown out 
with the bath water:  we need more regulation, but 
should clearly not go so far that we end up with 
a financial system so safe that it stifles long term 
growth. Lisbon’s broad conceptual thrust has not 
been invalidated by the crisis. Put simply, countries 
which fail to lift their educational performance will 
condemn themselves to lower living standards, and 
be all the more exposed to rising income inequalities 
flowing from globalisation and technological change.
The immediate danger for the EU, as for others 
round the world, is that in the face of the rising social 
unrest often engendered by recession it becomes 
even more difficult to push through much of the 
reform regarded as essential by the architects of 
the Lisbon agenda. There is indeed a risk that some 
European governments will be tempted to row back, 
undermining the single market in the process, and 
putting strain on some of the disciplines associated 
with the single currency. For the health of the EU 
economy it is most important that they should 
not. Europe badly needs more innovation, faster 
liberalisation, a keener spirit of enterprise, and a 
more flexible approach to employment. And it needs 
these qualities on a more uniform basis.   The best 
Europeans – for instance as regards E-readiness, 
or the quality of a country’s ICT infrastructure and 
the ability of its people to use ICT well – the best 
Europeans are among the best in the world, six 
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being in the global top ten. The level of broadband 
internet access in France, Germany and the UK is 
comparable to that of the US, while the latter is well 
behind the Nordic world and the Netherlands. But 
a clutch of other Europeans have records which are 
much less impressive.
The EU will certainly not meet its original 2010 Lisbon 
agenda objective – but the agenda’s aims remain 
valid. Its methods – often benchmarking and peer 
pressure rather than central direction – are likely 
to survive, since the EU treaties leave such areas 
as labour markets, social security and education in 
the hands of the member states. Its targets remain 
an indispensable guide to the desirable direction of 
reform, and an essential contribution to the task 
of meeting the great challenges we face:  those of 
ageing populations, increasingly rapid technological 
change, and globalisation. There is no magic bullet, 
but an unremitting drive to improve education and 
skills must on any analysis remain high on the agenda.
And what, finally, of the euro? As I mentioned already, 
last January it reached its tenth anniversary. For those 
interested in the detail, there is a 300 page European 
Commission assessment of the progress made so far, 
and the goals that still remain to be achieved.   The 
euro’s contribution as a factor of dynamism for the EU 
economy needs little emphasis. It has done much to 
promote price stability:  average annual inflation in the 
euro area in its first decade was 2.2%, the same as in 
Germany in the 1990s, despite the nearly 600% rise 
in the price of oil between 2002 and 2008. It helps to 
bring down the costs of borrowing. It has enhanced 
price transparency and convergence, increased trade, 
and promoted economic and financial integration, 
both within the euro area and with the rest of the 
world. It has greatly facilitated the completion of the 
Single Market, being one of the reasons why cross-
border trade in the euro area since it was introduced 
has increased by about ten percentage points in 
relation to GDP.
Yet all too obviously, as the President of the ECB said 
last January, this is no time for complacency:  there 
are challenges aplenty ahead.
First, the financial crisis, which is imposing much 
strain on the euro area as a whole, and even more on 
some EU member states – both inside and outside the 
euro zone. Precisely because of its relatively advanced 
state of integration, the zone has to absorb a number 
of country-specific shocks which in the absence 
of internal exchange rates and with fiscal policies 
constrained by the SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) 
are in some ways less easy to deal with than they 
used to be: the onus of internal adjustment now falls 
on relative wages and prices, along with the need to 
ensure labour market flexibility.
Second, Economic Union. The solidity of the single 
currency rests on two pillars:  an effective monetary 
policy, and a set of sound economic policies – 
including the firm implementation of the SGP and 
constant efforts to make the EU economy more 
productive, innovative and dynamic (You see there 
the connection to the Lisbon agenda). The ECB lays 
much stress on the importance of structural reforms, 
both of the markets for goods and services and of the 
labour market (especially to promote labour mobility).
Third, making a success of enlargement, both of 
the EU and of the euro area. It is inspiring to have a 
single market of 500 million people, but its newest 
segments still need much nurturing to make them a 
decently homogeneous part of the whole.
Fourth, all the other Lisbon agenda objectives I have 
already mentioned – especially the need to improve 
education and thus develop an increasingly skilled 
work force, to maintain Europe’s competitiveness in 
the global market place.
Fifth, the rapid ageing of the EU’s population, due to 
change from the current situation of four people of 
working age for every elderly person to a new ratio 
of two to one, with potentially far-reaching economic 
ramifications. This will call for a variety of counter 
measures, at a time when public indebtedness is 
already high.
And sixth, the ever clearer requirement – as well as 
opportunity – for a stronger EU foreign economic 
policy. As Commissioner Almunia argued earlier 
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this month, Europe should play an international 
role commensurate with its economic weight. It 
has the world’s second most important currency, 
plus shares in world GDP and trade flows surpassing 
those of the United States, and is the world’s largest 
aid donor. It arguably needs a stronger voice in the 
international financial institutions – though needless 
to say there is much dispute about what form that 
could or should take. One clear insight emerging from 
the wreckage of the world’s financial system is surely 
that global economic integration demands stronger 
global governance – which inevitably for any regional 
association of states begs some sensitive questions 
about how it organises its governance.
That in turn connects to the underlying wider 
philosophical challenge that confronts and has to 
be kept under review by every new EU generation 
– namely the question of how far further economic 
integration will require more political integration. That 
same supranational element in the EU which creates 
some asymmetry between the EU and ASEAN also 
continues to give rise, as it always has done, to debate 
inside the EU. The integrationist purists believe that 
the greater the role of the union in the economic 
sphere, the greater the need for political integration, 
while there is also no shortage of Europeans who 
think, to put it mildly, that political integration has 
gone far enough.
This is of course a very old debate. Over sixty years 
ago, in 1947, the League of Nations Secretariat 
produced an analysis of customs unions which 
included this passage:
“For a customs union to exist, it is necessary to 
allow free movement of goods within a union. For 
a customs union to be a reality, it is necessary to 
allow free movement of persons. For a customs 
union to be stable, it is necessary to maintain free 
exchangeability of currency and stable exchange 
rates within the union. This implies, inter alia, free 
movement of capital within the union. When there 
is free movement of goods, persons and capital in 
any area, diverse economic policies concerned with 
maintaining economic activity cannot be pursued. To 
assure uniformity of policy, some political mechanism 
is required. The greater the interference of the state 
in economic life, the greater must be the political 
integration within a customs union”.
That sequence of lapidary statements can only prompt 
a wry smile, since logical though it undoubtedly 
is, on one plane, it fails to take account of the 
complexity of human nature and the force of historical 
experience. Immanuel Kant, the 18th century German 
philosopher, used to warn that using reason without 
applying it to experience would only lead to illusions. 
“Out of the crooked timber of humanity”, he said,“no 
straight thing was ever made”.
European statesmen have learned over time 
since 1957 that they need to work with the grain 
of the people of Europe, not against it – which 
some of them have found an easier lesson than 
others. They need, to switch metaphors, to chart a 
way forward which is both navigable and inspiring. 
Integration, as European history since 1957 very 
clearly shows, can be hugely advantageous, 
and there is a strong case for taking it further, 
but it is an undeniably complex and sensitive 
process, which requires careful planning and good 
advertising, if it is not to run straight into pavlovian 
nationalist opposition.
The United Kingdom’s experience of this story is 
perhaps especially instructive. It was a Briton – Lord 
Cockfield – who designed the European Single 
Market, in which the large majority of the British 
have always believed, while resenting what many 
have seen as excessive standardisation. But we 
have had our difficulties, to say the least, both with 
freedom of movement of people and with the idea 
of a single currency. These and any other issues 
which interest you I would be very happy to explore 
further in discussion.
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